一批奶粉，两组数据，相差近30倍。澳门官方检出铅超标9倍，菲仕兰自证“完全合规”。

五天之内连发三份声明，措辞从克制到强硬——这不是一场普通的食品安全事件，而是一场关于“谁说了算”的规则之争。

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一组数据，两个答案

7月25日，澳门市政署发布食品预警：一批香港版皇家美素力1段奶粉（批号1W07KPJ，净含量800克，2025年9月30日生产），铅含量检出0.2mg/kg。按照澳门《食品中重金属污染物最高限量》中婴幼儿配方食品铅含量不得超过0.02mg/kg的规定，超标9倍。澳门方面当即要求业界下架、回收及停止出售涉事批次。

菲仕兰当晚即给出另一组数字：委托荷兰Triskelion实验室对同批次留样复检，结果<0.007mg/kg。两组数据之间，差了将近30倍。

此后几天，双方动作密集。

7月27日，菲仕兰香港公司与澳门相关部门会面，提交了两家第三方实验室对同一批次三个样本的完整检测报告。同日晚间，澳门方面通报：扩大抽检该品牌1至4号奶粉共13个样本，铅检测均未见异常；2024年至2026年6月，澳门在市场及进口层面共抽取131个婴幼儿食品样本检测，此前也无铅超标个案。

但涉事批次的食品预警，仍在生效。

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从“提交报告”到“强烈质疑”，菲仕兰为何步步升级

7月29日，菲仕兰发出第三份声明。措辞与前两份截然不同——不再只是“提交报告”“申请复核”，而是直指澳门方面“用单罐奶粉样本作检测，并且在不进行复检的情况下就公布检测结果”。声明中还指出，澳门方面尚未就复检申请提供更多检测技术细节和完整报告。

一次食品安全事件，何以演变成企业对监管部门的公开质疑？

在消费志看来，菲仕兰的“硬刚”并非一时冲动。这家拥有150多年历史的荷兰乳企，正处在一个微妙的节点上。

就在事件爆发前一周，菲仕兰刚刚发布2026年上半年财报。数据显示，上半年营业收入68.34亿欧元，同比基本持平；但营业利润2.69亿欧元，同比下降25.9%；净利润1.38亿欧元，同比下滑40%。全球乳制品价格走低、黄油市场疲软，加上成员牛奶供应量同比增长18.5%带来的成本压力，都在侵蚀利润。

而美素佳儿正是菲仕兰最核心的利润支柱。以2025年上半年为例，以美素佳儿为核心的专业营养品业务贡献了集团总营业利润3.63亿欧元的60.3%。在中国市场，根据尼尔森IQ数据，2026年第一季度美素佳儿在婴配粉市场（不含羊奶粉及跨境电商）市占率位列第三，在国际品牌中排名第一。

在消费志看来，一组数据勾勒出了菲仕兰的处境：一边是利润下滑25.9%的业绩压力，一边是贡献六成利润的核心产品遭遇安全性质疑。如果不能在第一时间强硬回应、守住“产品合格”的底线，带来的可能不仅是舆论危机，更是实实在在的市场份额流失。

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30倍差距，技术解释还是制度鸿沟？

同一批次产品，两组数据相差近30倍，可能性有多大？

科信食品与健康信息交流中心副主任阮光锋向央广网分析称，这种差异在技术上确实可能存在，主要原因在于“粉末状产品中重金属的局域污染”这一特殊场景——单一样本的检测结果可能无法代表整批产品的安全状况。

但乳业分析师宋亮则持不同看法，他认为不同的检测方法导致如此大的差异“可能性不大”。

分歧的背后，是一个更深层的问题：检测程序本身。

据我国《食品安全抽样检验管理办法》，抽取的样品应分为检验样品和用于复检、异议的备份样品。一位地方市场监管工作人员介绍，“抽检必须有备样，防止出现异议”。

而菲仕兰方面指出，澳门地区的食品安全法规偏于原则性、框架性，在食品抽检方面并无明确规定。有分析认为，欧盟对婴幼儿配方奶粉（粉末状）的铅含量限值为0.02mg/kg，而中国国标为0.08mg/kg，不同地区的标准差异反映了风险管控理念的区别。

在消费志看来，这场争议的本质，或许并非产品质量本身出了系统性问题——澳门扩大抽检的13个样本全部合格、过去131个样本无一超标，都指向这是一个孤立事件。真正的矛盾在于：当澳门采用的抽检程序与品牌方期待的国际通行的“备样复检”程序之间存在制度性差异时，谁的标准说了算？

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信任的脆弱：一次异常如何动摇一个品牌

尽管澳门方面表示涉事批次未流入中国内地，海关总署也发布消费提示称内地暂未发现涉事产品通过一般贸易渠道进口，但恐慌已经蔓延。

社交平台上，消费者的焦虑清晰可感：“就是担心奶粉不安全，所以专门买贵的高端线，结果还是出问题了”“刚刚从别的品牌转到美素力”“我只关心真相，相关部门能不能把内地的在售产品再抽检一次”。

这种焦虑并非没有参照。今年1月，雀巢因供应商ARA原料问题在全球发起预防性召回。彼时菲仕兰迅速切割，声明美素佳儿原料由旗下公司自供、未使用涉事供应商的ARA。社交媒体上，不少消费者表示“正是那个时候，从其他品牌转到美素佳儿”。

讽刺的是，不到半年，同样的“信任转移”逻辑，可能正在反向作用于菲仕兰自己。

截至7月29日，澳门方面尚未就菲仕兰的复检申请作出正式回应。涉事批次的食品预警仍在生效，澳门已巡查64间次零售点，回收48罐产品。

这场拉锯的最终走向，取决于两个变量：一是澳门方面是否会接受复检申请、如何回应程序争议；二是消费者在信息不对称中，愿意相信哪一方的说法。

在消费志看来，无论最终结果如何，这起事件都已经给整个婴配粉行业提出了一个棘手的问题：在跨境电商和代购日益普及的今天，同一品牌在不同司法管辖区面对不同的检测标准与程序，企业如何建立一套能够跨区域说服消费者的质量背书体系？当监管规则不统一、检测程序有差异时，消费者的信任又该托付给谁？

这不是菲仕兰一家企业的问题，而是整个跨境婴配粉市场必须直面的制度性命题。

One batch of milk powder, two sets of data, nearly a 30-fold discrepancy. Macau authorities detected lead at 9 times the permitted limit; FrieslandCampina asserts it is “fully compliant.”

Three statements issued within five days, with wording escalating from restrained to confrontational — this is not an ordinary food safety incident, but a dispute over rules: who gets to decide?

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One Set of Data, Two Answers

On July 25, the Macau Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau issued a food alert: a batch of Hong Kong-version Friso Prestige Stage 1 infant formula (batch number 1W07KPJ, net weight 800 grams, produced September 30, 2025) was found to contain lead at 0.2 mg/kg. Under Macau’s “Maximum Limits of Heavy Metal Contaminants in Food,” which caps lead content in infant formula foods at 0.02 mg/kg, this represents nine times the permitted limit. Macau authorities immediately ordered the trade to remove, recall, and cease selling the affected batch.

That same evening, FrieslandCampina provided a different set of figures: a re-test of retained samples from the same batch, commissioned from the Netherlands-based Triskelion laboratory, returned a result of <0.007 mg/kg. The gap between the two data sets is nearly 30-fold.

In the days that followed, both sides moved intensively.

On July 27, FrieslandCampina Hong Kong met with Macau authorities and submitted complete test reports from two third-party laboratories covering three samples from the same batch. That evening, Macau announced that it had expanded sampling to 13 samples across the brand’s Stages 1 to 4 formulas, all of which showed no abnormalities in lead testing. Between 2024 and June 2026, Macau had tested 131 infant food samples at the market and import levels, with no prior cases of excessive lead.

But the food alert for the affected batch remains in effect.

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From “Submitting Reports” to “Strong Challenge”: Why FrieslandCampina Escalated Step by Step

On July 29, FrieslandCampina issued its third statement. The wording was entirely different from the first two — no longer merely “submitting reports” or “applying for re-testing,” but directly accusing Macau authorities of “using a single can of milk powder as a test sample and publishing test results without conducting a re-test.” The statement also noted that Macau had not yet provided further technical testing details or complete reports regarding the re-test application.

How did a food safety incident evolve into a company’s public challenge to a regulator?

In the view of Xiaofeizhi, FrieslandCampina’s “hard-line stance” was not an impulse. This Dutch dairy company, with over 150 years of history, stands at a delicate juncture.

Just one week before the incident erupted, FrieslandCampina had released its first-half 2026 financial results. The data showed first-half revenue of EUR 6.834 billion, roughly flat year-on-year; but operating profit of EUR 269 million, down 25.9% year-on-year; and net profit of EUR 138 million, down 40% year-on-year. Declining global dairy prices, a weak butter market, and cost pressures from an 18.5% year-on-year increase in member milk supply are all eroding profitability.

And Friso is precisely FrieslandCampina’s core profit pillar. Taking the first half of 2025 as an example, the specialised nutrition business centred on Friso contributed 60.3% of the group’s total operating profit of EUR 363 million. In the Chinese market, according to NielsenIQ data, Friso ranked third in the infant formula market (excluding goat milk powder and cross-border e-commerce) by market share in the first quarter of 2026, and first among international brands.

In the view of Xiaofeizhi, a set of data outlines FrieslandCampina’s predicament: on one side, the performance pressure of a 25.9% profit decline; on the other, a core product contributing 60% of profits facing safety questions. Failure to respond forcefully at the first opportunity and defend the bottom line of “product compliance” could bring not only a public opinion crisis, but very real loss of market share.

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A 30-Fold Gap: Technical Explanation or Institutional Chasm?

For the same batch of product, how likely is it that two data sets differ by nearly 30-fold?

Ruan Guangfeng, Deputy Director of the Kexin Food and Health Information Exchange Centre, told China National Radio that such a difference is indeed technically possible, mainly due to the special scenario of “localised contamination of heavy metals in powder products” — a single sample’s test result may not represent the safety status of the entire batch.

But dairy analyst Song Liang takes a different view, arguing that different testing methods causing such a large discrepancy is “unlikely.”

Behind the disagreement lies a deeper issue: the testing procedure itself.

According to China’s “Measures for the Administration of Food Safety Sampling and Inspection,” samples taken should be divided into inspection samples and backup samples used for re-testing and objections. A local market regulation official explained, “Sampling must include backup samples to prevent objections.”

FrieslandCampina, however, pointed out that Macau’s food safety regulations are more principle-based and framework-oriented, with no clear provisions on food sampling and inspection. Some analyses suggest that the EU’s lead limit for infant formula (powdered) is 0.02 mg/kg, while China’s national standard is 0.08 mg/kg — differences in regional standards reflect differing philosophies on risk management.

In the view of Xiaofeizhi, the essence of this dispute may not be a systemic problem with product quality itself — all 13 samples from Macau’s expanded testing passed, and none of the previous 131 samples exceeded limits, pointing to an isolated incident. The real conflict lies in this: when there is an institutional difference between the sampling procedure Macau employs and the internationally accepted “backup sample re-testing” procedure the brand expects, whose standard decides?

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The Fragility of Trust: How a Single Anomaly Can Shake a Brand

Although Macau stated that the affected batch did not enter mainland China, and the General Administration of Customs issued a consumer notice stating that the affected products had not been found to have been imported through general trade channels, panic has already spread.

On social platforms, consumer anxiety is palpable: “I was worried about formula safety, so I specifically bought the expensive premium line, and it still turned out to be a problem.” “I just switched from another brand to Friso.” “I only care about the truth — can the relevant authorities re-test the products sold in the mainland?”

This anxiety is not without precedent. In January this year, Nestlé launched a precautionary global recall due to a supplier ARA ingredient issue. At that time, FrieslandCampina moved quickly to distance itself, stating that Friso’s ingredients were self-supplied by its subsidiary and did not use the affected supplier’s ARA. On social media, many consumers said, “It was precisely then that I switched from other brands to Friso.”

Ironically, less than half a year later, the same “trust transfer” logic may now be working against FrieslandCampina itself.

As of July 29, Macau had not yet formally responded to FrieslandCampina’s re-test application. The food alert for the affected batch remains in effect, and Macau has inspected 64 retail points and recovered 48 cans of product.

The final direction of this standoff depends on two variables: first, whether Macau will accept the re-test application and how it responds to the procedural dispute; second, which side’s account consumers are willing to believe amid information asymmetry.

In the view of Xiaofeizhi, regardless of the final outcome, this incident has already posed a thorny question for the entire infant formula industry: in an era of increasingly widespread cross-border e-commerce and daigou purchasing, when the same brand faces different testing standards and procedures in different jurisdictions, how can companies build a quality endorsement system capable of persuading consumers across regions? When regulatory rules are inconsistent and testing procedures differ, to whom should consumers entrust their trust?

This is not a problem for FrieslandCampina alone — it is an institutional question the entire cross-border infant formula market must confront.